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GOD’S STANDING TO FORGIVE
Brandon Warmke
It is generally thought that we cannot forgive people for things they do to oth-
ers. I cannot forgive you for lying to your mother, for instance. I lack standing 
to do so. But many people believe that God can forgive us for things we do to 
others. How is this possible? This is the question I wish to explore. Call it the 
problem of divine standing. I begin by cataloging the various ways one can have 
standing to forgive a wrongdoer. I then provide two solutions to the problem 
of divine standing.
I. Introduction
Consider two cases:
LUCY:	 I	lie	to	my	brother,	telling	him	I	bought	a	gift	for	our	parents	
when I did not do so. Realizing my guilt, I ask my new plumber 
Lucy to forgive me for my lie. Lucy forgives me for lying to my 
brother.
GOD:	 I	lie	to	my	brother,	telling	him	I	bought	a	gift	for	our	parents	
when I did not do so. Realizing my guilt, I ask God to forgive 
me for my lie. God forgives me for lying to my brother.
The claim that Lucy could forgive me for lying to my brother will, I think, 
strike most people as strange. And yet for many people, it will not seem 
nearly so strange to think that God could do so. An apparently central 
tenet of all three Abrahamic faiths is that God can and does forgive human 
persons for the wrong things they do to one another. But how is this pos-
sible? Because I lied to my brother—and not to Lucy—we are inclined to 
think that Lucy cannot forgive me. She lacks standing to do so. But then 
why think that God can forgive us for the wrongs we do to others? Just 
as	I	did	not	lie	to	Lucy	about	the	gift,	I	did	not	lie	to	God	about	the	gift.	If	
Lucy does not have the standing to forgive me, how does God? This is the 
question I wish to explore: How could God have the standing to forgive us 
for the things we do to one another? Call this the problem of divine standing.1
1To avoid confusion, I stress that my question is how God could have the standing to 
forgive us for the wrongs we do to others. Sometimes I will simplify and speak about “God’s 
standing	to	forgive,”	but	unless	otherwise	specified	this	should	be	taken	to	refer	to	God’s	
forgiveness for interpersonal human wrongs.
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I begin with some preliminaries. First, I will assume for present pur-
poses that God’s forgiveness is not supremely mysterious. Some may be 
content to respond to the problem of divine standing by claiming that it 
is	indeed	a	mystery,	but	that	there	is	little,	if	anything,	we	can	say	about	
God that would explain how such forgiveness is possible. I adopt a meth-
odology that allows serious and sustained inquiry into divine forgiveness. 
If	it	turns	out	that	this	methodology	is	misguided,	or	we	find	no	rationally	
satisfying solution to the problem, we may still perhaps learn something 
illuminating along the way.
Second, throughout I will use the term “wrongdoer” to refer to an agent 
who is a putative candidate for being forgiven. I use the terms “wrong” 
and “wrongdoing” to refer to the conduct (i.e., acts, omissions, or the con-
sequences of acts or omissions) for which a wrongdoer is forgiven. I will 
say that we forgive each other for “wrongs.” In using this term, I do not 
mean only to refer to failures to comply with moral principles or rules. As 
to whether we may be forgiven for morally permissible conduct that is 
morally bad I remain neutral.
Third, let us distinguish the issue of divine standing from other ques-
tions we can ask about God’s forgiveness. One such question concerns 
the nature of God’s forgiveness. What is God’s forgiveness? If and when 
God forgives, what does God do?2 Another question concerns the norms 
bearing on God’s forgiveness. Under what conditions is God’s forgiveness 
morally good, right, or just? And what reasons or motivations would a 
morally perfect being have in forgiving? However, to ask how God is in a 
position	to	forgive	me	for	my	lie	is	to	ask	a	different	kind	of	question,	one	
about standing. To say that someone has standing to forgive is to say that 
they have the power to forgive (whether or not they do so, and whether 
or not their doing so is morally good).3 If Lucy lacks standing to forgive 
me, then forgiving is not on the table for her; she is not a candidate for 
forgiving.	Consider	an	analogy:	a	priest	and	I	might	both	sincerely	utter	
“I now pronounce you husband and wife” to a couple seeking to wed. 
Only the priest would have married the couple, however, because only the 
priest has the power, or standing, to do so. Similarly, Lucy and my brother 
might	both	sincerely	utter	“I	forgive	you.”	Only	my	brother	would	have	
forgiven me because only my brother has the power, or standing, to do so.
We can distinguish two further questions about standing. One question 
asks who has the standing to forgive, either in some particular case or in 
general. Call this the identification question about standing. Answers to this 
2I have explored the nature question in Warmke, “Divine Forgiveness I” and “Divine 
Forgiveness II.” See also Adams, “Forgiveness: A Christian Model”; Bash, Forgiveness; Brien, 
“Can God Forgive Us Our Trespasses?”; Drabkin, “The Nature of God’s Love and Forgive-
ness”; Geuras, “In Defense of Divine Forgiveness”; Londey, “Can God Forgive Us Our 
Trespasses?”; Mackintosh, Christian Experience of Forgiveness; Minas, “God and Forgiveness”; 
Scheiber, “May God Forgive?”; Strabbing, “Divine Forgiveness and Reconciliation”; and 
Swinburne, Responsibility and Atonement. 
3As	far	as	I	know,	Jeffrie	Murphy	was	the	first	to	introduce	“standing”	as	way	of	talking	
about who is a candidate for forgiving (Murphy and Hampton, Forgiveness and Mercy,	174).
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question might involve simply listing individual persons who have the 
standing to forgive in a particular case. More general (and perhaps more 
illuminating) answers may involve providing a set of features, such that 
if some individual possessed them, then that person would thereby have 
the standing to forgive. For example, it might be thought that one has 
standing to forgive a wrongdoer only if one is the victim of that wrong-
doing	(in	some	relevant	sense	of	“victim”).	Jeffrie	Murphy	expresses	this	
view when he writes,
I do not have standing to resent or forgive you unless I have myself been the 
victim of your wrongdoing. I may forgive you for embezzling my funds; 
but it would be ludicrous for me, for example, to claim that I had decided to 
forgive Hitler for what he did to the Jews. I lack the proper standing for this. 
Thus, I may legitimately resent (and hence consider forgiving) only wrong 
done to me.4
In contrast, it might be thought that there are multiple features such that 
possessing any one of them gives someone the standing to forgive. For 
example, you might hold that someone has the standing to forgive a 
wrongdoer if either (a) one is the victim of the wrongdoing; (b) one feels 
resentment toward the wrongdoer because of what she did to the victim; 
or (c) one has a certain kind of relationship with the victim (such as an 
especially close friendship).
A distinct question concerning standing asks why it is that some and not 
others have standing. Call this the explanatory question. Suppose, for ex-
ample, that only victims of wrongdoing have the standing to forgive. Why 
is that so? One way of answering the explanatory question is to advert 
to the nature of forgiveness itself; there is something about the phenom-
enon of forgiveness that dictates who can and cannot forgive. Suppose, for 
example, that forgiving requires the overcoming of resentment, and that 
only victims of wrongdoing (as opposed to third parties) can feel resent-
ment. This would explain why only victims have the standing to forgive, 
for only they meet a requirement on forgiveness itself. On the other hand, 
there may be some other kind of explanation for why only some have 
standing	to	forgive—an	explanation	that	doesn’t	bottom	out	in	the	consti-
tutive features of forgiveness itself.5
4Murphy and Hampton, Forgiveness and Mercy, 21, emphasis in original.
5Note	 the	 following	 point	 of	 clarification.	 Philosophers	 writing	 on	 moral	 blame have 
asked	their	own	questions	about	standing:	the	identification	question	as	to	who	has	standing	
to blame, either in some particular case or in general; and the explanatory question as to why 
some people rather than others have the standing to blame. It is crucial to note, however, that 
in	the	blame	literature,	“standing”	is	understood	differently.	To	see	why,	notice	that	many	
people claim that one lacks standing to blame if one’s blame would be hypocritical (e.g., I 
blame you for smoking when I am myself a smoker). To say that one lacks standing to blame 
is not to say that one does not have the power to blame. Rather, it is to say that were one to 
blame, one’s blame would be morally impermissible or inappropriate. When we claim that 
someone lacks standing to forgive, however, we mean that she cannot forgive. Noting this 
difference	between	blame-standing	and	forgiveness-standing	is	crucial	to	avoid	confusion.	
See	Todd,	“A	Unified	Account	of	the	Moral	Standing	to	Blame,”	for	further	discussion.
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With	those	matters	out	of	the	way,	here	is	how	we	will	proceed.	In	Sec-
tion II, I catalog various forms of standing to forgive. One may think of 
these	forms	of	standing	as	comprising	different	answers	to	the	identifica-
tion question. In Section III, I assess these forms of standing as potential 
solutions to the problem of divine standing. In Sections IV and V, I take 
these	 results	 into	consideration	and	offer	 two	solutions	 to	 the	problem.	
One solution concedes that God lacks standing to forgive but argues that 
this is no problem. The other solution shows that God does have standing, 
identifies	which	form	of	standing	God	has,	and	explains	why	it	might	be	
that God is able to forgive in this way.
II. Varieties of Standing
II.A. Direct Standing
Consider a case of wrongdoing and subsequent forgiveness between two 
very	close	friends.	Alfred	lies	to	Betty,	a	lie	(we	can	suppose)	that	does	not	
affect	anyone	else.	In	such	a	case,	Betty	was	directly	wronged	by	Alfred.	
Though	I	will	not	attempt	a	full	account	of	what	it	means	to	be	directly	
wronged	 by	 someone,	 the	 general	 idea	 is	 that	 for	 Betty	 to	 be	 directly	
wronged by Alfred means that Alfred’s conduct itself constituted a wrong 
against	 Betty;	 he	 failed	 Betty,	 morally	 speaking.	 One	 may	 be	 directly	
wronged in many ways. One may be lied to, cheated on, have something 
stolen,	be	kidnapped,	or	be	assaulted.	And	as	stipulated	in	our	case,	Betty	
was	the	only	one	wronged	by	Alfred’s	lie.	We	may	say	that	Betty	has	ex-
clusive direct standing to forgive. Her standing to forgive is direct insofar as 
she was directly wronged, and it is exclusive because she is the only one 
with the standing to forgive Alfred for that wrong.
It is possible, however, for a single act to result in multiple victims who 
each have standing to forgive. Suppose that Alfred addressed his lie to 
Betty	and	Jill,	attempting	to	deceive	them	both.	Betty	and	Jill	are	each	di-
rectly wronged by Alfred, yet neither has exclusive standing to forgive. 
Call such cases of standing shared direct standing.
Yet there is another way for multiple people to have direct standing to for-
give a wrongdoer for something the wrongdoer does. Suppose that Alfred 
lies	to	Betty,	as	in	the	original	case.	Suppose	also	that	Alfred	has	made	a	
promise to his mother, Sue, to no longer tell lies. By conducting himself in 
a	certain	way,	Alfred	has	at	once	lied	to	Betty	and	broken	a	promise	to	Sue.	
Here,	it	seems	to	me,	both	Betty	and	Sue	have	been	wronged	directly,	but	
in	different	ways.	Betty	is	the	victim	of	a	lie;	Sue	is	the	victim	of	a	broken	
promise	(Alfred,	we	might	say,	“let	her	down”).	Here,	both	Betty	and	Sue	
are	in	a	position	to	forgive	Alfred	for	his	action,	albeit	for	different	kinds	of	
wrongs.	Betty	may	forgive	him	for	the	lie,	Sue	for	the	broken	promise.	Call	
the	standing	that	both	Betty	and	Sue	possess	distinct direct standing.6
6It might be thought that this case is not best categorized as a case of distinct direct 
standing,	but	rather	just	a	matter	of	two	cases	of	exclusive	direct	standing.	Each	is	wronged	
directly,	but	only	Betty	can	forgive	Alfred	for	the	lie	and	only	Sue	can	forgive	for	the	broken	
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II.B. Indirect Standing
Suppose	that	Alfred	lies	to	Betty	and	this	results	in	Betty	being	an	hour	
late to pick up her brother Todd. Alfred did not lie to Todd, but by lying 
to	Betty	there	is	a	straightforward	sense	in	which	this	resulted	in	a	wrong	
being	done	to	Todd.	Had	Alfred	not	lied	to	Betty,	she	would	have	picked	
up	Todd	on	time.	Alfred	is	responsible	for	making	Betty	late	to	pick	up	
Todd and therefore responsible for wasting Todd’s time. It would be ap-
propriate	for	Alfred	to	apologize	both	to	Betty	and	Todd,	and	it	is	open	
to each of them to decide whether or not to accept Alfred’s apology and 
forgive him.
Here,	while	Betty	was	directly	wronged	and	so	has	direct	standing	to	
forgive,	Todd	was	not	directly	wronged.	Rather,	Alfred’s	lie	to	Betty	led	
to Todd’s being wronged indirectly.	And	because	 it	would	be	fitting	 for	
Todd to blame Alfred, and for Alfred to apologize to Todd, it is plausible 
to think that Todd also has standing to forgive Alfred, who is responsible 
for wasting his time.7 Call this indirect standing.8
II.C. Proxy Standing
Though controversial, it may be possible to forgive a wrongdoer on behalf 
of someone else. Suppose Ted’s adult daughter Maria is killed by a drunk 
driver. If Ted can forgive the drunk driver on behalf of Maria, he does so in 
virtue of possessing proxy standing. It is important to distinguish (a) Ted’s 
proxy standing to forgive the driver on behalf of Maria from (b) whatever 
direct or indirect standing Ted might possess that would enable him to 
forgive the driver for killing his daughter. It might be that when people 
promise. I take this point, and whether it is helpful to distinguish these two kinds of standing 
may just depend on how we decide to individuate actions and wrongdoings. The reason I 
think cases of distinct direct standing are interesting is that it appears there is one action of 
Alfred’s	that	constitutes	two	different	wrongs.	Betty	and	Sue	each	forgive	Alfred	for	the	same	
token	action,	but	not	for	the	same	token	wrong.	Such	a	case	is,	I	think,	interestingly	different	
from	a	case	in	which	Alfred	lies	to	Betty	and	then	later	on	that	day	breaks	a	promise	to	Sue.	
In	the	former	case,	we	have	two	token	wrongs	attached	to	the	same	token	action,	and	in	the	
latter	case	we	have	two	token	wrongs	each	attached	to	distinct	token	actions.	
7Consider	the	real-life	case	of	Anne	Marie	Hochhalter,	who	was	left	paralyzed	in	the	1999	
Columbine High School shooting. She wrote to Susan Klebold, mother of one of the shooters, 
to say “I have forgiven you and only wish you the best.” Presumably, Hochhalter was taking 
herself not to be forgiving Susan Klebold for doing the shooting, but for playing some role 
in her son’s upbringing. If such cases of forgiveness are possible, Hochhalter’s standing to 
forgive	appears	to	be	of	the	indirect	variety.	(See	Kim	2016.)	One	might	reply	that	Hochhalter	
was simply mistaken in thinking that she could forgive Susan Klebold in this way. Perhaps 
that is correct. For now, I see no harm in exploring the possibility of indirect standing. 
8As with direct standing, indirect standing could be exclusive or shared. If, for example, 
Alfred’s	lie	resulted	in	Betty	being	late	to	pick	up	both	Todd	and	his	friend	Beavis,	then	each	
could have shared indirect standing to forgive. Once we allow for indirect standing to for-
give,	difficult	questions	arise.	Suppose	that	Todd’s	being	picked	up	late	leads	him	to	default	
on a loan to his co-worker Joan, which means Joan’s daughter Mary’s car is seized, and so on. 
Can	Joan	forgive	Alfred?	Can	Mary?	I	leave	these	matters	unsettled.	Notice,	however,	that	
this	“dispersion”	of	standing	affects	direct	standing,	as	well	(see	n.	33).	Further,	it	may	not	
always	be	clear	whether	a	case	of	standing	should	be	classified	as	direct	or	indirect	(or	some	
hybrid of the two). The lines may be blurry, and there may be overlap.
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very close to us (like our children) are seriously wronged, we are also 
wronged. But this would not invoke proxy standing. X’s forgiving Y on 
behalf of Z for what Y did to Z is not the same as X’s forgiving Y for what 
Y did to Z (or for what this thereby did to X).
Even those sympathetic to the possibility of the proxy standing delimit 
the class of people who qualify for it.9 If you lie to your best friend, it is 
hard to see how a random refrigerator salesperson from England could 
have the standing to forgive you on your friend’s behalf. What kind of 
special relationship is required? A close familial tie or close friendship 
would be the clearest examples of the required special relationship in 
order to have proxy standing. This is why it is plausible to think that Ted 
could forgive on behalf of his daughter Maria, but that Maria’s hedge fund 
manager could not.
II.D. Third Party Standing
Finally, consider third party standing. Third party standing enables one to 
engage in third party forgiveness. What is labeled “third party” forgive-
ness	 in	 the	forgiveness	 literature	 is	often	a	source	of	confusion.	Charles	
Griswold rightly points out that some forms of standing are misleadingly 
labeled “third party.” For example, he asks us to imagine the murder of 
a loved one, and the question of whether to forgive presents itself to us 
in light of the loss we’ve sustained. “This sort of case,” he says, “is not a 
matter	of	 third-party	forgiveness.”10 The standing to forgive that would 
accrue to such a person would be (to put it in our above terminology) of 
the	direct	or	indirect	variety,	depending	on	how	the	case	is	fleshed	out.
Griswold’s own view is that third party forgiveness involves the fol-
lowing:
A situation in which the question of forgiveness arises in light of your indig-
nation	at	the	loss	suffered	by	another	person,	thanks	to	someone	else’s	ac-
tions:	here	the	matter	concerns	your	forgiving	their	offender	on	their	behalf	
for the harm done to them (not to you).11
Yet because Griswold has in mind forgiving “on behalf” of the victim, this 
is instead best thought of as proxy standing.12
I reserve the designation “third party standing” for another possible 
(albeit controversial) form of standing in which a non-victim forgives a 
wrongdoer, but not on behalf of the victim. We may distinguish between a 
9See Griswold, Forgiveness,	 119.	 However,	 also	 see	 below	 for	 clarification	 about	 Gris-
wold’s view. 
10Griswold, Forgiveness,	117.
11Griswold, Forgiveness,	117.
12Griswold, Forgiveness,	119.	Griswold	argues	that	to	engage	in	what he calls third party 
forgiveness, the forgiver can do so only if she has “standing,” and one receives such standing 
only	if	one	has	an	“identification	with	the	victim.”	How	does	one	come	to	identify	with	the	
victim?	According	to	Griswold,	one	identifies	with	a	victim	only	if	one	has	(1)	“ties	of	care	for	
the	victim”;	and	(2)	“reasonably	detailed	knowledge	not	only	of	the	offender’s	wrong-doing	
and contrition, but especially of the victim” (Forgiveness,	119).
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non-victim being able to forgive a wrongdoer on behalf of the victim and a 
non-victim being able to forgive a wrongdoer full stop. One could, it seems 
to me, have one kind of standing but not the other. I identify as third party 
standing	what	both	Glen	Pettigrove	and	Margaret	Urban	Walker	have	in	
mind in their recent discussions of third party forgiveness.13 Such cases, 
Walker	writes,	involve	“the	scenario	in	which	A	forgives	the	offender	B	for	
something B did to the victim C, where A is not plausibly seen as a fellow 
victim, and where A forgives B on A’s own behalf, not on behalf of C or 
anyone else who might be a victim of the wrong.”14 Such a putative for-
giver,	she	says,	is	one	who	“suffered	no	wrong”	by	the	offender’s	actions.15 
This putative standing to forgive, therefore, is not reducible to any of the 
aforementioned varieties.
We arrive at four basic forms of standing: (1) direct standing (and its 
attendant	varieties);	(2)	indirect	standing;	(3)	proxy	standing;	and	(4)	third	
party standing. There is at least one other potential form of standing, but it 
is not relevant to the question of how God could forgive us for the wrongs 
we do to others, so I will set it aside.16 Do any of these forms explain how 
God has standing to forgive? To this question we turn.
III. Assessing the Options
III.A. Divine Forgiveness and Direct Standing?
Consider whether God has direct standing to forgive us for the wrongs 
we do to others. Recall that in order to have direct standing to forgive an 
agent for something, one must have been directly wronged by that agent. 
And so if God has standing to forgive me for, say, my lie to my brother, 
that	lie	must	in	some	sense	also	be	a	wrong	against	or	an	affront	to	God.
One way that God might have direct standing in such cases is if God 
has exclusive standing to do so. That is, only God has the standing to for-
give me for my lie to my brother. This is implausible, not only because in 
13See	Pettigrove,	“The	Standing	to	Forgive”;	and	Walker,	“Third	Parties.”
14Walker,	“Third	Parties,”	495.	Pettigrove	has	in	mind	the	same	logic	of	third	party	forgive-
ness: “Forgiving B for a wrong he has done to C is not the same as forgiving B for C” (“The 
Standing	to	Forgive,”	591,	italics	original).	I	take	the	italicized	“for”	to	mean	“on	behalf	of.”	
15Walker,	“Third	Parties,”	496.	
16For example, it may be possible to forgive oneself for something. This might happen in 
two ways. First, you might forgive yourself for something you did to yourself, such as the 
self-infliction	of	wounds.	Here,	though,	one	might	argue	that,	as	it	turns	out,	one	has	direct	
standing to forgive in virtue of being directly wronged (the wrongdoer and the victim just 
happen to be the same person). Perhaps the more interesting case is that of the wrongdoer 
forgiving herself for something she did to someone else, for in this case, the wrongdoer is not 
indirectly or directly wronged in the above senses. If such cases of forgiveness are possible 
(and some have argued they are—see Milam, “How is Self-Forgiveness Possible?”), then we 
need a variety of standing that allows for them. Call this reflexive standing. Since our question 
is how God would forgive us (and I take it that we and God (or the Godhead) are separate 
persons),	reflexive	standing	is	not	an	option.	It	might	be	thought	that	reflexive	standing	is	a	
species of third party standing: In both cases a non-victim has standing to forgive the wrong-
doer.	Yet	only	in	the	reflexive	case	is	the	non-victim	identical to the wrongdoer. This unique 
feature may require special explanation regarding the possibility of standing. 
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this	specific	case	it	rules	out	the	possibility	that	my	brother	could	forgive	
me for the lie, but also because, were we to generalize, it would mean 
that human persons never have the standing to forgive one another. Only 
God	does.	This	would	effectively	make	interpersonal	human	forgiveness	
impossible.	I	find	it	difficult	to	take	this	view	seriously.	Not	only	does	it	
seem obviously true that sometimes humans can forgive one another, but 
also	we	are	taught	to	forgive	one	another	in	Scripture	(see,	e.g.,	Matthew	
6:12,15;	Mark	11:25).	 I	 therefore	 set	 aside	exclusive	direct	 standing	as	a	
solution to the problem of divine standing.17
What about shared direct standing? Here, if you recall, an action con-
stitutes multiple wrongs of the same type against multiple victims. Each 
victim has the standing to forgive the wrongdoer for the same type of 
wrong occasioned by the act in question. One act of lying, for example, 
gives two victims of my lie standing to forgive me for the lie. How might 
this explain how God could forgive us for interpersonal wrongs? In my 
lying to my brother, I would be creating two victims who each have direct 
standing to forgive me: my brother and God. Immediately, this avoids the 
problem of exclusive direct standing, for it allows that others besides God 
can have the standing to forgive me. However, this strategy gets some-
thing else wrong; it misconstrues the nature of the wrongdoing vis à vis 
God. This is because every wrong that I commit against my neighbor is not 
the same type of wrong that I commit against God. To punch a neighbor in 
the face is not to punch God in face. To murder an enemy is not to murder 
God. (Perhaps clearer examples could be given; I will not do so.) The point 
is that the wrong against our neighbor is not necessarily (and perhaps 
rarely, if ever) of the same kind as our wrong against God. Shared direct 
standing will not do.
Distinct	direct	standing,	however,	can	do	better.	It	gives	multiple	vic-
tims who were directly wronged the standing to forgive. It also allows 
that	 those	 victims	 may	 forgive	 the	 wrongdoer	 for	 different	 types	 of	
wrongs.	Consider	my	lie	to	my	brother.	In	this	one	act,	I	have	committed	
two wrongs, one against my brother and one against God. But because we 
have	allowed	that	one	act	can	constitute	two	different	kinds	of	wrongs,	
we avoid the above problem with shared direct standing. My brother can 
forgive me for lying to him, and God can forgive me for, say, disobeying 
17In recent work, Martha Nussbaum claims that the Christian understanding of forgive-
ness	attributes	to	God	exclusive	direct	standing	to	forgive.	In	the	“transition	from	Judaism	
to Christianity,” she says, “the independent human-human forgiveness process, already de-
emphasized in Judaism, simply drops away: all forgiveness is really from God (sometimes 
mediated by clergy). If you square your relationship with God, then the other person is 
by	definition	 satisfied,	and	you	do	not	need	 to	engage	 in	 separate	negotiations	with	 that	
person” (Anger and Forgiveness,	69).	But	 this	 is	an	egregious	misunderstanding	of	Christi-
anity.	Christ	commands	interpersonal	forgiveness	(Matt.	18:21–35),	Paul	encourages	it	(Col.	
3:12–13),	and,	as	noted	above,	Christians	are	positively	taught	to	forgive	other	humans	(Matt.	
6:9–15).	Perhaps	most	forceful	is	Christ’s	teaching	at	Mark	11:25	(NLT):	“And	when	you	stand	
praying, if you hold anything against anyone, forgive them, so that your Father in heaven 
may forgive you your sins.”
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God’s command not to lie.18 This looks like a promising solution to the 
problem of God’s standing to forgive.
Yet	here	 is	 a	 further	difficulty.	 If	 there	 are	 two	wrongs—one	 against	
God that only God has standing to forgive and one against our neighbor 
that only our neighbor can forgive—then it appears that there are some 
wrongs that God can never forgive. This is because God does not have 
direct standing to forgive me for lying to my brother. God can forgive me 
only for disobeying the relevant command. It seems to me, however, that 
many people who believe that God can forgive them for what they have 
done, believe (and desire) not just that God can forgive them for some 
of their wrongs, but for all of them. Many, I think, pray to God, not only 
that they would be forgiven for breaking God’s commands, but that God 
would forgive them for lying to their brother.
Of course, there is a sense in which, on this view, God can forgive people 
for what they do to others. The disobedience for which God is putatively 
able to forgive us is something that implicates us in doing something to 
another	person.	This	much	is	true.	But	there	is	a	difference	between	for-
giving someone for disobedience (in treating another person in this way) 
and forgiving them for the wrong done to the other. A teacher might for-
give a student for breaking her appointed classroom rules, but the teacher 
cannot forgive the student for lying to a fellow student. Only the student 
can do that. This brings into relief a problem for any proposed solution to 
the problem of divine standing that invokes a “two wrongs” approach. If 
we posit multiple wrongs, one of which God can forgive, there remains a 
wrong that God cannot forgive, and perhaps will never be forgiven (if the 
relevant human with standing to forgive never forgives).19 If we want to 
preserve the notion that God can forgive any	wrong	committed,	then	we	
cannot	construe	God’s	standing	to	forgive	simply	as	a	matter	of	possessing	
direct standing.20
III.B. Divine Forgiveness and Indirect Standing?
What about indirect standing? If we want both human victims and God 
to be able to forgive a wrongdoer, we need not insist that God and human 
18For	present	purposes,	 I	do	not	 think	 it	matters	how	we	construe	 the	 specific	way	 in	
which	such	actions	constitute	wrongs	against	God.	What	matters	is	that	God	can	forgive	us	
for something other than the wrong against a fellow human person. I’ll use disobedience 
simply as a placeholder. It may be thought that God cannot be wronged (see, e.g., Minas, 
“God and Forgiveness.”). I will not address this possibility here, and I simply assume that 
God can be wronged in whatever sense that is relevant to forgiveness. But for discussion of 
the various responses to Minas, including my own, see Warmke, “Divine Forgiveness I.” 
19Notice that the problem also faces views of divine standing that invoke shared direct 
standing as discussed above.
20It might be thought that with additional theological premises, we could avoid this con-
clusion. For example, suppose one adopted a kind of eschatological universalism such that 
eventually all human persons will be reconciled with their wrongdoers and forgive them. 
But this would only secure the claim that all wrongs are (eventually) forgiven. It would not 
give the result that God can	forgive	everyone	for	every	wrong	they	have	committed.
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victims both have direct standing to do so. One or the other could instead 
have indirect standing. There are at least two ways this could work.
First, when I lie to my brother, this results in an indirect wrong against 
God. On this view, God has been wronged, but only indirectly, through a 
direct wronging of someone else. In other words, when I lie to my brother 
I directly wrong him. This gives him direct standing to forgive me. In di-
rectly wronging him, however, this results in indirectly wronging God. 
This gives God indirect standing to forgive me.
Second, we might argue that when I wrong God, this results in an in-
direct wrong against my brother. My brother has indeed been wronged, 
but only indirectly, through a direct wronging of God. In other words, 
when I disobey God I directly wrong God. This gives God direct standing 
to forgive me. In directly wronging God, however, this results in my in-
directly wronging my brother. This gives my brother indirect standing to 
forgive me.21
On	either	reading,	however,	we	are	still	left	the	general	“two	wrongs”	
problem	encountered	above.	On	 the	first	 indirect	 strategy,	 there	 remains	
the question of how God could forgive me for my lie to my brother. When 
Alfred	lies	to	Betty	and	this	results	in	her	being	late	to	pick	up	Todd,	it	is	
true that Todd gets standing to forgive Alfred. But he does not get standing 
to	forgive	Alfred	for	lying	to	Betty.	Rather,	he	gets	standing	to	forgive	him	
for something that is expressible by a statement such as “I forgive you for 
delaying my pick up” or “I forgive you for making me wait in the rain.” A 
similar	problem	affects	the	second	indirect	strategy.	Even	if	God	can	forgive	
me for that direct wrong against God, this would not mean that God could 
also forgive me for the indirect wrong against my brother. In either case, 
there are interpersonal wrongs that God does not have standing to forgive.22
III.C. Divine Forgiveness and Proxy Standing?
The	options	canvassed	thus	far	attempt	to	ground	God’s	standing	in	the	
fact that God was wronged. But as we noted in Section II, there are putative 
21In the previous section, we developed the notion of being indirectly wronged (and pos-
sessing	indirect	standing	to	forgive)	in	what	looked	to	be	causal	terms:	Alfred	lied	to	Betty	
and	this	caused	her	to	be	late	in	picking	up	Todd.	Alfred’s	wronging	Betty	causes	Todd	to	be	
wronged,	too.	I	am	not	sure	it	makes	sense	to	put	matters	in	this	way	when	it	comes	to	that	
matter	of	wronging	God.	To	whatever	extent	it	makes	sense	to	say	that	we	wrong	God,	it	is	
strange to say either (a) that my lying to my brother causes God to be wronged; or (b) that 
my disobeying God causes my brother to be wronged. But we need not understand indirect 
wrongness in terms of causation. We might simply say that being indirectly wronged by s 
is the result of someone else being directly wronged by s. The relevant claim, I think, is that 
being indirectly wronged by a person somehow depends on someone else being directly 
wronged by that same person.
22I	briefly	mention	two	further	potential	problems	with	the	indirect	strategies.	The	first	
strategy is open to the charge that it miscasts the nature of my wrong against God. Is God 
wronged as a result of lying to my brother? Or is my wrong against God immediate and 
direct?	The	latter	strikes	me	as	the	correct	interpretation.	The	second	strategy	doesn’t	strike	
me to be an accurate read on the situation either. This view would have it that my wronging 
my brother is a result of my wronging God. But here again, it seems that I have immediately 
and directly wronged each. 
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varieties of standing that do not require that one be wronged by X in order 
to forgive X for that wrong. One such way is to forgive on behalf of the 
victim. Does it make sense to explain God’s standing to forgive us for 
wrongs we do to others by adverting to proxy standing? I can’t see how.
One reason is this: typically, proxy standing is in play because those 
who have (or would have had) direct or indirect standing to forgive are 
not actually able to forgive. They are incapacitated or deceased, for ex-
ample. In such cases, the standing to forgive can be transferred to a proxy 
in special relationship with the victim. If this is how the story is supposed 
to go, then as a general theory about how God has standing to forgive, 
this will not do. Perhaps God has proxy standing to forgive us when our 
victims are incapacitated or deceased, but this would not explain God’s 
standing in the other cases.
Second, if God’s standing is proxy, then the best we can reasonably 
do is to ask that God forgive us on behalf of our victim. Yet this miscasts 
the nature of what I believe many to be asking for when they ask God 
to forgive them for such interpersonal wrongs. They are not asking God 
to forgive them in lieu of their victim’s forgiveness. I may think that my 
brother is perfectly capable of forgiving me and yet think that God can do 
so as well, and that this has nothing to do with God’s forgiving me on his 
behalf.	Proxy	standing	does	not	sufficiently	capture	the	way	that	God	is	
thought to forgive us for our interpersonal wrongs—God forgives us on 
God’s own behalf, not on anyone else’s.
III.D. Divine Forgiveness and Third Party Standing?
If God had third party standing to forgive us our interpersonal wrongs, 
then we could satisfy what I take to be the primary desiderata for a solu-
tion	 to	 the	problem	of	 divine	 standing.	We	 could	 affirm	 the	 following:	
(1) humans are wronged and have direct standing to forgive; (2) God is 
wronged and has direct standing to forgive; and (3) all wrongs can be for-
given by God. Even though we would advance a “two wrongs” solution, 
if God could forgive me for lying to my brother as a third party, then there 
would be no wrongs God cannot forgive. All would be well.
The	trouble	is	that	it	is	very	difficult	to	explain	how	third	parties	have	
standing	 to	 forgive.	 Indeed,	 this	 difficulty	was	 built	 into	 the	way	 I	 set	
up the problem of divine standing at the outset. If Lucy, as a third party, 
cannot forgive me for lying to my brother, how could any third party? 
How could God? For now I simply point out that third party standing, if 
it	offers	a	solution	to	the	problem	of	divine	standing	at	all,	does	not	offer	
an easy one. I will return to this issue in Section V.
IV. Solution 1—Concession and Comfort
Our goal has been to account for the way that God has standing to forgive 
us for interpersonal wrongs. The assumption has been that God does have 
such standing. Yet the prospects for an acceptable solution to the problem 
of divine standing look dim. In the next section I will defend what I take 
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to be the best strategy for solving the problem. Before doing so, I pursue a 
different	response	to	the	problem	of	divine	standing:	conceding	that	God	
cannot have the standing to forgive interpersonal wrongs. For many, this 
will be an entirely unsatisfactory response. I share the concern. But I want 
to	offer	comfort	for	those	who	either	find	this	response	attractive	or	who	
worry that ultimately, we may not be able to give a satisfying account of 
God’s standing to forgive interpersonal wrongs.
Here is the picture. When I lie to my brother, I commit two wrongs: I 
lie to him and I, say, disobey God. But just like my brother cannot forgive 
me for my disobedience to God, God cannot forgive me for my lie to my 
brother.	We	can	think	of	the	matter	as	involving	two	cases	of	distinct	direct	
standing. This is the concession: there is no “solution” to the problem of 
divine standing.
Here	 is	 the	 comfort:	Upon	 careful	 reflection,	 there	 is	 little	 reason	 to	
expect that God would have the standing to forgive us for the things we 
do	to	others.	And	since	there	is	little	reason	to	expect	this	of	God,	there	
is	little	reason	to	be	disappointed	to	find	out	it	is	so.	But	why	shouldn’t	
we expect God to be able to do this? It is important to keep in mind that 
there are just some things God cannot do. That is okay. God cannot sin or 
self-annihilate. Nor can God possess any standing—such as the standing 
to repent—that would require previous fault on God’s part.23 The standing 
to forgive human interpersonal wrongs may just be one of those things 
that God cannot possess. This may seem more plausible when we remind 
ourselves of the relational nature of forgiveness. The reason that others 
cannot forgive me for lying to my brother is just the fact that they are 
not members of that relationship in which the lie was told. But it is no 
indictment against God if God is not a member of that relationship and so 
cannot do things that only the members of that relationship have standing 
to do. Just like God does not possess the “standing” to keep your marriage 
vow to your spouse (only you have “standing” to do that), there are other 
things that God cannot do because of their inherently relational nature. 
Possessing the standing to forgive humans for their interpersonal wrongs 
may simply be one of them. If so, then God’s lack of standing to forgive 
you for lying to your wife is no less a problem than God’s lack of standing 
to keep your wedding vows to your wife.
It might be objected that these cases are not relevantly similar. Keeping 
wedding vows is not something we would expect (or want!) God to do or 
be able to do. But this is not so with forgiveness. We should expect God to 
be able to forgive us for the things we do to others.
In reply, the concessive comforter should say the following. First, she 
should remind the critic that there is a sense in which God does forgive 
her for her interpersonal wrongs. Because she (by lying) acts in a way that 
disobeys God, God can forgive her for this. Yet God can only forgive her 
for the things for which she does in relation to God, and this is why God 
23I thank Mark Murphy for the example. 
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can only forgive us for the disobedience, and not for the lying. The critic 
can be comforted with the thought that God can forgive all wrongs com-
mitted	against	God.	Every	single	one	of	them.
Second,	 the	comforter	 should	ask	 the	critic	 to	consider	a	benefit	of	a	
theory that limits God standing to forgive, namely that it secures for the 
victims of interpersonal wrongs a unique kind of standing to forgive. Why 
is	this	a	benefit?	Because	it	offers	a	way	of	explaining	why,	on	the	Chris-
tian view at any rate, it is so important to forgive those who wrong us.24 
Victims of typical interpersonal wrongs are the only ones who can forgive 
their wrongdoers for those wrongs. So if forgiveness for a wrong is to take 
place at all, it will only take place if the victim forgives the wrongdoer for 
it. God will not and cannot do it instead of me or on my behalf.
Third, recall that one concern with certain kinds of “two wrong” strate-
gies is that they make it in principle impossible for some wrongs to be 
forgiven by God. And if there are some wrongs that God cannot forgive, 
then there will be “sins” that cannot and never will be forgiven. However, 
the comforter will want to show the critic that worries about perpetually 
“unforgiven wrongs” can be overblown. For insofar as a wrong is a wrong 
against God, it can be forgiven by God—there are no wrongs against God 
that God cannot forgive. And so as far as God’s relationship with us is con-
cerned, there are no “remainder” wrongs that must remain unforgiven. 
That other people may not forgive us for the wrongs we commit against 
them is something that God has allowed. But whether we are forgiven by 
others, it might argued, has no bearing on whether God can forgive us.25 
God	extends	the	offer	of	forgiveness	to	all	those	who	would	ask.
V. Solution 2—God’s Third Party Standing
I can sometimes work myself into feeling the comfort in concession. But 
it	still	seems	to	me	that	it	would	be	better—in	some	respect	or	other—if	
God could forgive me for my interpersonal wrongs. I confess the feeling (I 
am not sure it is much more than that) that there must be a way of making 
sense of this possibility.
So in what follows I will sketch a way of securing God’s standing 
to forgive. Here are the basics of the solution, which is, except for one 
amendment, much the same at Concession and Comfort. When I wrong 
my brother, I commit two wrongs: I lie to him and I, say, disobey God. 
My brother has direct standing to forgive me for the lie because he was 
directly wronged by the lie. And God has direct standing to forgive me for 
my disobedience because God was directly wronged by it. Now here is the 
difference:	God	can also forgive me for my lie to my brother because God 
possesses third party standing to do so.
24I	am	grateful	to	Matthew	Benton	for	suggesting	this	thought.
25Some	biblical	texts	appear,	on	their	face,	to	complicate	matters:	“But	if	you	do	not	for-
give	others	their	sins,	your	Father	will	not	forgive	your	sins”	(Matt.	6:15).	Cf.	Mark	11:25:	
“And when you stand praying, if you hold anything against anyone, forgive them, so that 
your Father in heaven may forgive you your sins.” 
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If this solution is viable, it meets several desiderata for a solution to 
the problem of divine standing. First, it captures the way in which our 
interpersonal wrongs are distinctive wrongs against both another human 
and against God. We do not have to deny that when humans wrong each 
other that there are two direct victims of those wrongs. This is why God 
and our human victim each has direct standing to forgive us (albeit for dif-
ferent	wrongs).	Second,	the	solution	I	offer	doesn’t	require	that	one	wrong	
is the result or consequence of the other, such that either my brother or 
God gets the standing to forgive only in virtue of the fact that someone 
else	was	wronged.	Third,	while	I	offer	a	“two-wrongs”	solution,	it	doesn’t	
have the consequence that there are wrongs that cannot be forgiven by 
God. Fourth, this solution does not rely on any notion of proxy standing. 
God does not forgive me for lying to my brother on my brother’s behalf. 
God straightforwardly forgives me for lying to my brother on God’s own 
behalf.
The	 trick	 in	pulling	off	 this	solution	 is	 to	give	a	plausible	account	of	
third party standing to forgive, not just in general, but such that God 
could possess it with respect to the wrongs we do to others. Because this 
is, as I see it, the biggest hurdle, I will proceed as if it is unproblematic that 
human victims have direct standing to forgive us for our wrongs against 
them and that God has direct standing to forgive us for our wrongs 
against	God.	This	 is	not	 actually	 the	 case,	of	 course.	These	are	difficult	
questions in their own right and any complete solution to the problem of 
divine standing of the sort I defend here will have to say something about 
each of them. But for now, I will simply focus on giving an account of 
God’s third party standing to forgive.
That agents can possess third party standing is far from obvious. In 
fact, the Lucy case with which we began might suggest that it is down-
right counter-intuitive. We need some kind of argument for its palatability. 
Let	us	begin	by	considering	one	such	argument	by	Glen	Pettigrove.26 His 
strategy	first	 identifies	a	plausible	account	of	 the	nature	of	 forgiveness.	
According	to	Pettigrove,	we	can	forgive	a	wrongdoer	by	(a)	overcoming	
hostile	 reactive	 attitudes	 provoked	 by	 the	 wrongdoing,	 (b)	 restoring	 a	
relationship disrupted by the wrongdoing, and (c) reassessing the wrong-
doer’s moral character. The argument for third party forgiveness then 
proceeds as follows:
1. If an agent accomplishes (a–c), then she has forgiven.
2. Agents other than the victim can accomplish (a–c).
3. Therefore, agents other than the victim can forgive.27
This is a simple, clever, straightforward argument: because victims can for-
give by accomplishing (a–c), then non-victims can do so as well. Standing 
26Pettigrove,	“The	Standing	to	Forgive”;	Forgiveness and Love.
27Pettigrove,	Forgiveness and Love, 34.
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to forgive is built right into the very conditions on successful forgiveness. 
Suppose you blow up my best friend’s car. I take up hostile reactive at-
titudes, disrupt my relationship with you, and think less of your character. 
However,	were	I	to	overcome	these	attitudes,	restore	our	relationship,	and	
reassess	your	character	(say,	after	your	sincere	apology,	remorse,	and	resti-
tution), then I would have forgiven you for torching my friend’s car. Third 
party forgiveness is therefore established.
However, I am not convinced that this argument provides us with the 
materials to secure third party standing in general or God’s third party 
standing to forgive in particular. The argument doesn’t secure God’s third 
party standing in particular because it is unlikely that God forgives by 
overcoming	hostile	reactive	attitudes	(on	the	assumption	that	God	cannot	
have	such	attitudes	in	the	first	place28). Of course, this is not a criticism of 
the	plausibility	of	the	argument	as	it	stands;	Pettigrove	was	not	using	it	to	
establish	God’s	third	party	standing	in	the	first	place.
But even if the argument is taken only to support the plausibility of 
third party standing in general, I think the critic has a reply open to her. 
The problem is not premise (2); I do think that agents other than the victim 
can accomplish (a–c). And there is an important sense in which I do not 
deny premise (1). Although I am not convinced that one can forgive by ac-
complishing (a–c), I am happy to grant this point for the sake of argument. 
The problem with premise (1), however, is that it obscures an important 
distinction concerning the conditions on forgiveness.
To	 see	 the	problem,	notice	 that	Pettigrove	 claims	 that	 accomplishing	
(a–c)	 is	 sufficient	 for	 forgiveness	 (even	 if	accomplishing	neither	 (a),	 (b),	
nor	 (c)	 is	 individually	necessary	 for	 forgiveness).	 I	 think	Pettigrove	has	
in	mind	what	we	can	call	a	set	of	sufficient	constitutive conditions on an 
instance	of	forgiving.	These	are	the	conditions	that	attach	to	the	various	
behaviors	or	attitudes	that	the	putative	forgiver	exhibits	in	forgiving.	To	
put	 matters	 crudely,	 the	 constitutive	 features	 of	 forgiveness	 are	 those	
things that the putative forgiver “does” when she forgives. It is in this 
sense	that	I	am	happy	to	grant	that	Pettigrove	identifies	a	set	of	features	
that	is	sufficient	for	forgiveness.
However,	just	because	an	agent	meets	sufficient	constitutive	conditions	
on forgiveness, this does not mean that she forgives. This is because an 
agent may fail to satisfy another kind of condition that is necessary for 
forgiveness: an enabling condition. Enabling conditions on forgiveness put 
one	 in	a	position	 to	 forgive	 in	 the	first	place.	 If	enabling	conditions	are	
not	met,	 then	 even	 if	 an	 agent	 succeeded	 in	meeting	 a	 set	 of	 sufficient	
constitutive conditions on forgiveness, that agent would fail to forgive. 
It is widely thought, for example, that unless someone does something 
that is morally wrong (or perhaps morally bad or morally vicious), then 
forgiveness cannot take place. Furthermore, it is commonly thought that 
forgiveness cannot take place unless the wrongdoer in question was 
28Warmke, “Divine Forgiveness I.”
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morally responsible for her conduct.29 The fact that morally responsible 
wrongdoing is an enabling condition on forgiveness explains why we 
cannot forgive bears, bees, or babies—they simply aren’t candidates for 
forgiveness.
Once we are reminded that there are enabling conditions on forgive-
ness,	we	see	 that	simply	meeting	sufficient	constitutive	conditions	does	
not mean that one has thereby forgiven. One might have failed to meet 
a necessary enabling condition. Having standing to forgive is a plausible 
necessary	enabling	condition.	Here	then	is	the	reply	open	to	Pettigrove’s	
critic. We cannot show that third parties can forgive simply by showing 
that	 they	meet	 a	 set	 of	 sufficient	 constitutive	 conditions	 on	 forgiveness	
unless we already assume that third parties have standing to forgive (or 
perhaps don’t need standing). But this is to beg the question against those 
who claim that such parties lack standing to forgive.
Because	I	am	unsure	about	the	soundness	of	Pettigrove’s	strategy	for	
securing third party forgiveness, I will suggest another kind of strategy 
and then apply it to the problem of divine standing. The common and 
perhaps even natural way to argue for third party standing involves the 
methodology of expanding the class of potential forgivers. This expansion 
strategy begins with the assumption that direct victims of wrongdoing 
have standing to forgive their wrongdoers. We then provide reasons for 
widening the circle of those with standing. The trouble with this strategy 
is that arguments for expanding the class of forgivers must begin with 
certain standard assumptions about standing, such as the assumption that 
one must be the victim of a wrongdoing to forgive one for it. This puts the 
burden on the expander to defend third party standing on the home turf 
of standard views.
But here is another strategy: assume provisionally that everyone has the 
standing to forgive a wrongdoer and then identify reasons for limiting the 
class of potential forgivers. This contraction strategy forces us to rethink 
why	one	must	have	standing	to	forgive	in	the	first	place.	Instead	of	asking,	
“What	reason	is	there	for	letting	more	people	have	the	standing	to	forgive	
a wrongdoer?” we ask, “Why doesn’t everyone have the standing to for-
give	a	wrongdoer?”	I	will	turn	to	answering	this	question	shortly,	but	first	
I want to identify two reasons for being amenable both to the contraction 
strategy and ultimately to the possibility of third party standing.
First,	as	Glen	Pettigrove	points	out,	“People	often	say	things	like,	‘I	will	
never	 forgive	 him	 for	what	 he	did	 to	 her,’	 or	 ‘It	 has	 taken	 a	 very	 long	
time,	but	I	have	finally	forgiven	him	for	what	he	did	to	her.’”30 Suppose, 
for example, that I treat my mother very rudely and that my brother per-
sonally and deeply cares about both her and me. It strikes me as being 
perfectly felicitous if he were to say something like, “It has taken a very 
long	time,	but	I	have	finally	forgiven	him	for	what	he	did	to	her.”	Taken	
29For discussion of these assumptions, see Hughes and Warmke, “Forgiveness.”
30Pettigrove,	Forgiveness and Love, 34.
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at face value, ordinary language gives us some reason to be open to third 
party forgivers.
Second, if forgiveness is limited only to victims of wrongdoing, then 
there is a curious feature of our moral responsibility practices: there is no 
third-person analogue to forgiveness. It is important to keep in mind that 
both the victim of wrongdoing and a third party can blame wrongdoers 
for the same wrong (e.g., by resenting them, censuring them, altering respec-
tive relationships). If I lie to my brother, then both you and my brother can 
blame me for doing so. But suppose that both you and my brother give up 
your respective blaming stances against me. If only victims have standing 
to forgive, then only my brother would count as forgiving me. But what 
would we call your pivot away from blame? If it cannot be forgiveness, 
what is it? I don’t mean this to be an argument for third party standing. 
However, I do think it gives us reason to be open to third party forgivers.31
With	the	ground	softened	a	bit,	I	now	want	to	see	where	the	contrac-
tion strategy can take us. We begin with the assumption that everyone 
has standing to forgive any interpersonal wrong. One way to contract 
standing is to ask: What is the complaint we would have against someone 
who claimed to forgive but was not appropriately positioned to forgive? 
I suggest that the heart of our complaint is not (merely) that the person 
is not the victim of the wrongdoing. Rather, the complaint is a more gen-
eral one: that the person is not appropriately involved in the relationship 
between the victim and wrongdoer. If Lucy my new plumber claims to 
forgive me for lying to my brother, I think that the appropriate response 
is to say that the fact that I lied to him is, as it were, none of her business. 
“This is between him and me,” I would say, and if it were true, then I think 
I	have	provided	a	sufficient	reason	for	thinking	that	Lucy	lacks	standing	
to forgive me. The crucial point is that I need not advert to the claim that 
Lucy was not the victim of my lie to show that she lacks standing to forgive 
me. I can advert to a more general explanation: this is not her business.
How, then, does a wrong between persons become “your business?” 
One obvious way is if you are the victim of the wrong. But another way 
in which a wrong can become your business is if the wrong is done by 
someone you personally care about and to someone you personally care 
about. Recall the case in which I treat my mother very rudely, and sup-
pose that my brother personally cares about each of us. Suppose he were 
eventually	 to	 tell	me,	 “It	has	 taken	a	very	 long	 time,	but	 I	have	finally	
forgiven you for what he did to her.” Complaining that he lacks standing 
to forgive me because I did not treat him rudely seems to miss the mark. 
But	suppose	my	brother	was	long-lost,	had	just	finally	met	my	mother	and	
me, and just recently found out that I treated our mother rudely. Here I 
think I would be in the right to say that this isn’t really his business. But 
if, on the contrary, he had known me and our mother his entire life and 
31For further discussion of why it is reasonable to start with the assumption that everyone 
has standing, see Radzik, “On Minding Your Own Business.” 
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cared for each of us deeply, it is much less clear that the same complaint is 
sufficient	to	show	that	he	can’t	forgive	me.
In the kind of case I have in mind, then, the third party (my brother) 
personally cares for both the victim (our mother) and the wrongdoer (me). 
This is why he is able to forgive me for wronging her. At minimum, I 
think this gives us good reason to allow at least some cases of third party 
forgiveness, cases in which the third party has deep personal cares for 
both the victim and the wrongdoer.
What are personal cares? To say that S personally cares for P is to say 
that S’s relationship with P minimally involves two aspects. First it is to 
say that S personally knows P.32 Close friendships, familial relationships, 
and marriages typify this kind of personal knowledge. Second, S’s person-
ally caring for P involves S’s seeking P’s objective good. S wants what is 
best for P and is invested in this outcome. Without developing an entire 
account	of	what	such	caring	involves,	personal	cares	are	best	identified	by	
ostension. Imagine close, loving friendships, familial relationships, and 
marriages. Personal cares are things members of those relationships have 
for one another.33 Therefore, Lucy would not have standing to forgive me 
for treating my mother rudely, but my brother would; she lacks the per-
sonal cares that he has.34
32For more on knowing persons, see Benton, “Epistemology Personalized.” 
33Note	that	both	personal	cares	and	the	way	that	wrongs	affect	one’s	relationship	with	
the wrongdoer come in degrees. One might object, then, that on this view, there is some 
grey area about the extent to which one must personally care about a victim (and the ex-
tent	to	which	the	interpersonal	wrong	affects	my	relationship	with	the	wrongdoer)	to	have	
standing. But if this is a problem, it is a problem for commonly accepted views of standing to 
forgive in which one receives standing by being the victim of a wrong. This is because there 
is a spectrum along which one is counted as a victim of wrongdoing. If I witness someone 
slapping a friend and this causes me distress, am I a victim? Suppose I hear about a burglary 
in my neighborhood and so feel less safe in my own home, am I a victim? And of course, 
there are the cases of indirect victimhood discussed in Section II. Presumably there are grey 
areas even on the widely-accepted views about standing. If they are not problems for victim-
only views of standing, I cannot see why they are problems for personal care views.
34An objection might be the following: Stalkers might have these kinds of personal cares, 
and	so	possess	the	standing	to	forgive.	Yet	there	is	something	fishy	about	Lucy	possessing	
the standing to forgive me for my lie to my brother because she is my stalker. Here are 
three	kinds	of	flat-footed	replies.	First,	we	could	bite	bullets:	Insofar	as	Lucy	is	a	stalker	of	a	
certain sort (she truly does know and personally care for me and my brother), she can forgive 
me for the things I do to others. That she is a stalker is irrelevant. Second, we could deny 
that stalkers have personal cares in the relevant sense. I said above that personal cares are 
typified	by	relationships	of	certain	sorts:	close,	loving	friendships;	familial	relationships;	and	
marriages. Stalking is unlike the other kinds of relationships because stalking relations are 
typically not welcomed by the one being stalked. Perhaps, then, for a personal care to give 
one third party standing to forgive, the forgiven party must welcome or accept the personal 
cares of the third party. A third reply is that for personal cares to give a third party the 
standing to forgive, the caring must be appropriate to the kind of relationship one has with 
the wrongdoer. If one’s cares for the wrongdoer are inappropriate given the kind of relation-
ship one has with the wrongdoer, then one will not have standing to forgive. Lucy does not 
get standing to forgive me even if she has deep personal cares for me because those cares are 
not appropriate for the relationship we have with one another. What gives one third party 
standing are appropriate personal cares, viz. when one meets the conditions for caring in a 
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Even if personally caring for both the victim and wrongdoer can give 
one standing to forgive, this is only to provide an answer to the iden-
tification	about	 standing,	not	 the	explanatory	question	 (from	Section	 I).	
We may still ask: Why do personal cares for the victim and wrongdoer 
give one standing to forgive? To see why, consider the perspective of the 
wrongdoer	who	is	asking	a	third	party	for	forgiveness.	After	treating	my	
mother rudely, I might say to my brother, “Please forgive me for treating 
mom that way.” Among other things, I am asking that the wrong that I 
committed	against	her	not	cause	harm	to	our relationship that he will not 
allow to be healed. That I’ve wronged someone he cares about harms (or 
can harm) our relationship. For him to forgive me for wronging her there-
fore crucially involves, among other things, allowing his relationship with 
me	to	be	healed	after	my	wrongdoing.35
But what work is the relationship of personal care doing in this ex-
planation of his standing to forgive? Suppose instead that the case under 
consideration is one where I lie to my brother and the issue is whether 
Lucy the plumber can forgive me. Because neither her relationship with 
me	nor	her	 relationship	with	him	 is	 one	 of	 personal	 care,	 it	 is	 difficult	
to see why she would regard my lying to him as something that would 
damage her relationship with me. “You’re just a paying client,” she might 
say,	“whether	you	lie	to	your	brother	or	not	doesn’t	really	affect	us.”	That	
Lucy lacks relationships of personal care with both of us explains why this 
case	is	different	than	the	previous	one.
It also explains why God can have third party standing to forgive us for 
wrongs	we	do	to	others.	And	so	here—finally—we	can	apply	our	results	
to the case of divine standing. Here is the basic picture, no doubt in need 
of much further elaboration. If third parties who personally care for both 
victim and wrongdoer can have standing to forgive the wrongdoer then a 
fortiori God can as well. This is because there is no agent who personally 
cares more for a victim and wrongdoer than does God. When we wrong 
others, this causes damage to our relationship with God. And because God 
is in relationships of personal care with both us and our victims, this gives 
God standing to forgive us. This distinctive divine third party forgiveness 
is God’s way of not allowing our wrongs against others to harm or destroy 
our relationship with God.
Here’s an objection. One goal of the paper has been to show that there 
are no wrongs that God cannot forgive. Suppose I’ve shown this. You 
way that is not inappropriate to the relationship between the parties. I thank Mark Murphy 
for raising the stalker case and for suggesting this third way of replying to it.
35It	may	be	objected	that	by	admitting	that	my	wrongdoing	harmed	my	relationship	with	
my brother, I have thereby wronged him and so he is a victim of one sort or another and 
that therefore I have smuggled direct or indirect standing through the back door. But simply 
damaging or harming a relationship does not mean that anyone was wronged. I have moved 
away from close friends. This harmed our relationship. But my moving and damaging those 
relationships did not itself mean that I morally wronged those friends. Breaking up with a 
partner also damages a relationship, but breaking up with a partner does not itself entail 
moral wrongdoing. 
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might	still	worry	that	after	God	has	done	all	the	forgiving	that	God	can	do,	
there remains forgiveness that has not been accomplished that one should 
want to occur. Suppose that God third party forgives me for lying to my 
brother.	 If	my	brother	does	not	 forgive	me,	 then	there	 is	still	“leftover”	
forgiveness that has not been accomplished. So, here’s the objection: if part 
of the motivation for showing that God can forgive interpersonal human 
wrongs is the conviction that there are no wrongs that God cannot forgive, 
isn’t it a weakness of my proposal that it permits unaccomplished acts of 
forgiveness?36
One response is the following. Once you have God’s forgiveness for 
every	 wrong	 you	 have	 committed,	 you	 do	 not	 need	 forgiveness	 from	
anyone else, including the victim. But this is mistaken. Interpersonal 
human forgiveness between victim and wrongdoer accomplishes many 
good	 things:	 the	overcoming	of	 anger	 and	bitterness	on	 the	part	of	 the	
victim, the rebuilding of trust and restoration of a relationship, and the 
equalizing of a moral relationship between victim and wrongdoer. These 
things cannot be accomplished by God’s forgiveness, and they are valu-
able in addition to God’s third party forgiveness for those same wrongs. In 
fact, interpersonal human forgiveness is so important that in the Christian 
tradition it is commanded.37 Therefore, we cannot dismiss so easily the 
importance	of	forgiveness	that	may	still	be	accomplished	even	after	God	
has forgiven all the possible wrongs there are to forgive.
The correct reply to this objection is simply to point out that a full 
theory of the economy of forgiveness, at least in the Christian tradition, 
will preserve two thoughts: (1) that there are no wrongs that God cannot 
in principle forgive; and (2) that interpersonal human forgiveness is so im-
portant that it is commanded. We should preserve (1) because there is no 
wrongdoing for which one cannot approach God and request forgiveness, 
knowing “he will forgive our sins and purify us from all our wrongdoing.” 
(1	John	1:19,	emphasis	added)	We	should	preserve	(2)	because	there	are	
uniquely good things that only human interpersonal forgiveness can 
achieve. A view that allowed for some wrongs to be outside the reach of 
God’s forgiveness would contravene (1). On the other hand, claiming that 
once God forgives no other forgiveness needs to take place would con-
travene (2). The theory I have presented preserves both (1) and (2). There 
are no wrongs that God cannot forgive and yet there are still some acts 
of forgiveness only other humans can accomplish. God’s forgiveness can 
achieve things that human forgiveness cannot and vice versa. We should 
not be worried that there are remaining acts of human forgiveness that can 
and	should	take	place,	even	after	God	has	done	all	the	forgiving	that	God	
can do. This is precisely what a theory should say.
36I am grateful to Mark Murphy for pressing this point. 
37See	n.	17	above.	
401GOD’S STANDING TO FORGIVE
VI. Conclusion
Many questions remain. I have not explained how exactly it is that 
wronging one person can harm one’s relationship with a third person. Nor 
have I discussed cases in which a third party has a relationship of personal 
care with only the victim (or the wrongdoer). Nor have I said much more 
about the nature of divine forgiveness than that it involves not allowing an 
interpersonal wrong to harm or destroy one’s relationship with God. There 
is also much more to be said about personal cares and how they secure 
standing to forgive. But for those who think the problem of divine standing 
is	 a	 real	puzzle	and	are	dissatisfied	with	 conceding	 that	 there	are	 some	
things God cannot forgive, I have sketched a strategy that secures God’s 
standing to forgive us for our wrongs against God and our wrongs against 
others. Further, this strategy does so using three plausible premises about 
God: (1) that God personally cares for all of us; (2) that God’s relationship 
with us is damaged when we wrong others; and (3) that God’s forgiveness 
involves, at least in part, reconciling that relationship.38
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